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B.: Banks and Banking--Negotiable Instruments--Delivery of Incomplete

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
NEGOTIABLE, INSTRUMENTS - DE.Plaintiff signed a check
drawn on defendant bank and gave it to an employee to be filled
in and delivered to a particular person for a special purpose; the
check, placed in a drawer, was found or stolen by a third person
who filled in the blanks, using the name of a fictitious person as
payee, and presented it to the bank, indorsing it in the name of
the payee. The bank, although making some effort to identify the
payee, failed to do so satisfactorily, but cashed the check, and
charged it to the account of plaintiff. The depositor sues to recover the amount so charged to him. Held, that a bank paying
out a check without proper identification of the payee, and so
paying to a person not intended by the drawer, is negligent and
liable to the drawer for the amount of the check which has been
charged to his account. Hays v. Lowndes Savings Bank & Trust
Go.,
In terms of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the instrument
in this case was incomplete and undelivered, but by way of dictum,
the court says that if the bank had not been negligent in failing to
properly identify the payee "the loss sustained would have fallen
upon the maker of the check, who, by his carelessness, had made
it possible that fraud could be perpetrated." This statement seems
in conflict with section 152 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
which provides that "When an incomplete instrument has not been
delivered, it will not, if completed and negotiated without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder as against any
person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery."
However, judicial 3 and text' authorities recognize a qualification
where the drawer was negligent. One decision' has recognized that
the statute could be strictly applied to this factual situation, but
the idea was discarded without discussion and the decision based
on estoppel and negligence. One case was decided within the
BANKS

AND BANKING -

LIVERY OF INCOMPLETE INSTRUMENT. -

1 190 S. E. 543 (W. Va. 1937).
2 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 46, art. 1, § 15.
3 See notes 8-12 infra.
4 Britton, Neglgence in the Law of Bills and Notes (1924) 24 CoL. La.REV.
695, 713; 5 Micnr, BANKS AND BAN iNG (1932) § 181; for an amusing discussion of the two possible views see EWART, ESTOPPEL (1900) 460-461.
5 Heinberg v. Lincoln Nat. Bank, 113 N. J. L. 76, 172 Ati. 528 (1934).
6 Holzman Cohen & Co. v. Teague, 172 App. Div. 75, 158 N. Y. Supp. 211

(1916).
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section only after the court had explained that the drawer had not
been negligent. A third court 7 held that a showing of the drawer's
negligence was not precluded by section 15.
New York cases have made a distinction between those cases
in which the drawee bank was involved with the drawer, and those
in which a holder in due course was suing the drawer. Feeling
that a duty of great care was owed by the depositor to his bank,
they have thrown liability on the drawer in the former case and
relieved him in the latter.9 Other courts have made the drawer
liable to his bank when his negligence caused the negotiation of
the check, without discussing the New York distinction.10
One case,1 going beyond the others, does not make the distinction, but allows a holder in due course to recover from the
negligent drawer. This case cannot be so easily justified as the
others, which, at least, have the rationale that the duty owed one's
bank is paramount to the rights under section 15.
The principal case and others like it 12 carry the idea of negligence one step further. Recognizing that the drawer's negligence
would make him liable in spite of the lack of delivery, these courts
hold that if the drawee bank was negligent in identifying the payee,
it will be estopped to set up the drawer's negligence. In effect,
this is no more than applying the tort doctrine of "last clear
chance" in the field of negotiable instruments.
It is submitted that in the interest of predictable laws governing commercial paper, it would be better to apply the relevant
statutes strictly, and not make such cases as the principal one depend on a showing of negligence on one side or the other. Although the rule might be harsh in particular instances, it would
7 S. S. Allen Grocery Co. v. Bank of Buchanan County, 192 Mo. App. 476,
182 S. W. 777 (1916).
8 Trust Co. of America v. Conklin, 65 N. Y. Misc. 1, 119 N. Y. Supp. 367
(1909).
9 Holzman Cohen & Co. v. Teague, 172 App. Div. 75, 158 N. Y. Supp. 211
(1916); Linick v. A. J. Nutting & Co., 140 App. Div. 265, 125 N. Y. Supp.
93 (1910).
10 Snodgrass v. Sweetser, 15 Ind. App. 672, 44 N. E. 648 (1896) ; S. S. Allen
Grocery Co. v. Bank of Buchanan County, 192 Mo. App. 476, 182 S. W. 777
(1916); Edelen v. Oakland Bank of Savings, 39 Cal. App. 302, 178 Pac. 737

(1918).
11 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Spokane Valley Growers' Union, 132 Wash. 607,
232 Pac. 691 (1925), 43 A. L. R. 194 (1926); see also Phillips v. A. W. Joy
Co., 114 Me. 403, 96 Atl. 727 (1916), decided before adoption of the Negotiable
Instruments Law.
Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Reynolds, 72 Ind. App. 611, 126 N. E. 234 (1920);
Heinberg v. Lincoln Nat, Bank, 113 N. J. L, 76, 172 Atl. 528 (1934).
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create uniformity. If a different result is desirable, the change
should come from the legislature rather than the court.
E. H. B.
PRIVILEGES AND ImmuNITmis OF CITIRIGHT OF STATE TO IMPOSE REsZENS IN THE SEVERAL STATES-

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

REQUIRE ENT FOR DISTEmUTORS OF NONINTOXICATING BEER.
- H, a nonresident of West Virginia, applies for a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance to him of a license to distribute non-2
intoxicating' beer, contending that the West Virginia statute
which makes four years bona fide residence in the state a prerequisite to the issuance of such license is violative of the privileges
and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution. 3 Held, that
the statute was constitutional because the privilege involved was
denied only to nonresidents, and the Constitution requires equality
4
only as between citizens. Writ refused. Hinebaugb v. James.
The privileges and immunities clause of article 4, section 2,
denies to any state the right to discriminate between its citizens
and the citizens of other states.2 Four Supreme Court cases illustrate the view of that tribunal as to the application of this clause
to invidiousness between residents and nonresidents of a particular
state. In Blake v. McClungO the Court held a statute unconstitutional which gave "resident" creditors a priority as to the assets
of a foreign corporation doing business in the state, because the
real intent of the statute was to favor citizens of the state at the
7
expense of citizens of other states. La Tourette v. McMaster, deDENCE

l The West Virginia legislature has declared malt beverages not containing
more than five per cent of alcohol by weight to be nonintoxicating. W. Va.
Acts 1937, c. 12, art. 15, § 2.
2 d. at § 12(a).
S Counsel contended that the statute was invalid under both the privileges
and immunities clause of art. 4, § 2, providing: "The Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States"; and the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, providing: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States". The
Court dismissed the contention as to the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground
that no new rights are conferred by that privileges and immunities clause.
There is considerable authority for this proposition; Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U. S. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873) ; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 10 S. Ct. 930
(1890); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U. S. 129, 21 L. Ed. 929 (1874); but quacre
as to the extent to which the law has been changed in this respect by the recent case of Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935).
4 192 S. E. 177 (W. Va. 1937).
5 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 I. S. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873).
6172 U. S. 239, 19 S. Ct. 165 (1898).
7248 U. S. 465, 39 S. Ct. 110 (1919).
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